Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
All Decisions

Housing Court Decisions Project

2022-05-25

Eccles v. Patterson

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/housing_court_all

Recommended Citation
"Eccles v. Patterson" (2022). All Decisions. 701.
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/housing_court_all/701

This Housing Court Decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Housing Court Decisions Project at
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Decisions by
an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information,
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF KINGS: HOUSING PART Q
------------------------------------------------------------ X
SHAWNA ECCLES,
Petitioner,

Index No. 300197/2020

- against DECISION/ORDER
SHARITA PATTERSON,
Respondent.
-------------------------------------------------------------- X
Present: Hon. Jack Stoller
Judge, Housing Court
Shawna Eccles, the petitioner in this proceeding (“Petitioner”), commenced this
proceeding against Sharita Patterson, the respondent in this proceeding (“Respondent”), seeking
possession of 1444 East 91st Street, Apt. 2, Brooklyn, New York (“the subject premises”) on the
basis of a termination of an unregulated tenancy. The petition, verified on August 12, 2020,
pleads that Petitioner requires use of the subject premises for her own living purposes and that
Petitioner intends to personally occupy the subject premises. Respondent interposed an answer.
The Court held a trial of this case on May 17, 2022.
The trial
Petitioner submitted into evidence a deed dated February 27, 2019 showing that she is the
owner of the house in which the subject premises is located (“the House”) and that the House is a
two-family house; a one-year lease between the parties commencing on August 1, 2019 with a
monthly rent of $2,100; and a rent ledger showing arrears to date of $14,700. The pleading
shows that Petitioner served the appropriate predicate notice, dated May 14, 2020, prior to the
commencement of this proceeding pursuant to RPL §226-c(2)(c). The predicate notice does not
make an allegation with regard to Petitioner’s personal use of the subject premises.

1

Petitioner testified that she owns the subject premises; that there are two units in the
House; that she accepted funds pursuant to the Emergency Rent Assistance Program (“ERAP”);
that she has no place to live; that the units on the first floor of the House are rented out; that she
has been bouncing around between family and friends and sleeping on couches; and that all of
her finances have been going to the mortgage and the water bills.
Respondent testified that she is a special patrolman for the City of New York; that she
signed a lease in July of 2019; that she has lived in the subject premises for three years; that she
lives in the subject premises with three children; that Petitioner is the landlord; that Petitioner
lives in the basement of the House; that Petitioner’s grandmother lives in the first floor; that
Petitioner has lived in the basement since she signed the lease; that Petitioner moved in about
two weeks after Respondent moved in; that she sees Petitioner every day leaving at around 7
a.m.; that she does not know Petitioner’s grandmother’s name; and that Petitioner’s grandmother
says hello to her every day.
Respondent testified on cross-examination that she has not seen the basement unit.
Petitioner testified in rebuttal that she does not reside in the basement; that her stuff is
there; that she goes to the House to take out the garbage and to check on the older tenant who is
there; that she gets there at various times; and that no one lives in the basement.
Petitioner testified on cross-examination that she is employed and that her job is her
source of income.
Discussion
As Petitioner has shown that she is a proper party to commence this proceeding, that the
subject premises is unregulated, that there is no lease in effect, and that she properly effectuated
service of a predicate notice, Petitioner has proven her prima facie case.
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Respondent argues that Petitioner’s acceptance of ERAP benefits precludes Petitioner’s
cause of action. Acceptance of payment for rental arrears through ERAP shall constitute an
agreement by a landlord, inter alia, not to evict for reason of expired lease or holdover tenancy
for 12 months, unless the premises is located in a building with 4 or fewer units and if the
landlord intends to immediately occupy the unit for the landlord’s personal use as a primary
residence. L. 2021, c. 56, Part BB, Subpart A, §9(2)(d)(iv), as amended by L. 2021, c. 417, Part
A, §5. Respondent argues that the predicate notice did not allege that Petitioner was seeking
possession of the subject premises for her personal use.
Functions of a predicate notice include ending a tenant’s estate and informing a tenant of
the consequence associated with remaining in the premises after the termination of the tenancy,
Raffone v. Schreiber, 18 Misc.3d 925, 927 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2008), Katz v. Grifa, 156 Misc.2d
203, 206 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1992), which as a general matter means that a predicate notice
should enable the recipient to evaluate the risks of an adverse outcome if the recipient does not
abide by the notice. Compare 542 Holding Corp. v. Prince Fashions, Inc., 46 A.D.3d 309, 310
(1st Dept. 2007), 240 W. 37th LLC v. BOA Fashion, Inc., 24 Misc. 3d 145(A)(App. Term 1st
Dept. 2009)(a notice to cure should apprise a tenant of the alleged defaults in the lease), Fanny
Grunberg & Assocs., LLC v. Hyatt, N.Y.L.J. Dec. 9, 2002 at 21:5 (App. Term 1st Dept.)(a
predicate notice’s explicit factual premise for a landlord’s cause of action overrides a potential
defect arising from the notice’s erroneous citation of an incorrect section of a statute).
Given that Petitioner’s cause of action in this matter is a termination of an unregulated
tenancy, and that ERAP had not existed at the time of the service of the predicate notice and the
commencement of this proceeding, a representation in the predicate notice that Petitioner
intended to occupy the subject premises herself could not have had an effect on Respondent’s
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calculation on the risks of remaining in the subject premises. Petitioner was not required to
allege an exception to a protection against an eviction that had not existed at the time of the
service of the predicate notice. What remains for the Court to decide is whether Petitioner
intends to immediately occupy the unit for the landlord’s personal use as a primary residence.
Courts are not normally called upon to make a fact determination about a party’s intent to
do something in the future. So-called “owner’s use” cases are an exception. As of the enactment
of the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act (“HSTPA”) on June 24, 2019, the Rent
Stabilization Law conferred upon owners a cause of action for possession against rent-stabilized
tenants on the ground that the owners had an “immediate and compelling necessity” for their
personal use of the premises. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §26-511(c)(9)(b). Before June 24, 2019, the
Rent Stabilization Code conferred upon owners a cause of action for possession against rentstabilized tenants for personal use without having to show an “immediate and compelling
necessity,” 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §2524.2(a)(1), although case law required a showing of a “good faith
intent.” Hirsch v. Stewart, 63 A.D.3d 74, 79-80 (1st Dept. 2009). A Court could potentially
render a finding of “good faith intent” on testimonial evidence alone if the Court found the
testimony credible. Horsford v. Bacott, 32 A.D.3d 310, 312 (1st Dept. 2006), aff’d, 8 N.Y.3d
874, 875 (2007), Moy v. Karki, 49 Misc.3d 138(A)(App. Term 2nd Dept. 2015).
An important factor in the Court’s evaluation of a rent-stabilized landlord’s credibility in
this regard had been the financial advantage a vacancy conferred upon owners of rent-stabilized
apartments before the passage of HSTPA. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §26-504.2(a), 9 N.Y.C.R.R.
§2522.8(a)(1). See Bourdouris v. Caravella, N.Y.L.J. Aug. 8, 2001 at 19:5 (Civ. Ct. Kings Co.),
citing Sobel v. Mauri, N.Y.L.J. Dec. 12, 1984 at 10:4 (App. Term 1st Dept.)(the intent to recover
the premises for personal use must not be a subterfuge for removal of tenants), Samra v.
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Messeca, 47 Misc.3d 150(A)(App. Term 1st Dept.)(rental of an apartment at a market rate that a
landlord previously obtained possession of on the ground of personal use is a factor in finding a
lack of good faith on a subsequent cause of action for personal use). An owner of an unregulated
two-family house has no such incentive structure, as such an owner can legally ask for any
amount of rent that the market can bear upon the expiration of a tenant’s lease. Logically, then,
an owner of a rent-stabilized apartment bears a greater burden of proving an intent to occupy an
apartment than an owner of an unregulated apartment.
The parties in this case, both interested witnesses, offered testimony disputing
Petitioner’s intent to move into the subject premises. Given the inherently speculative nature of
the fact determination that statute calls upon the Court to make, a determination of credibility
presents a different issue than a Court’s fact-finding concerning something that has already
occurred before the trial. Significantly, in this matter, Petitioner pleaded that she wished to
occupy the subject premises even though she did not have to plead as such and even though
ERAP did not exist at the time of the pleading, causing the Court to conclude that Petitioner’s
pleading as such was not pretextual. Petitioner’s pleading is consistent with her testimony. The
Court sees no reason to otherwise doubt Petitioner’s intent to move into this two-family house
that she owns.
Accordingly, it is ordered that the Court awards Petitioner a final judgment of possession
against Respondent. Issuance of the warrant of eviction permitted forthwith with execution
stayed through June 30, 2022 for Respondent to vacate possession thereof. On default, the
warrant may execute after service of a marshal’s notice.
It is further ordered that the Court awards Petitioner a judgment in unpaid use and
occupancy in the amount of $14,700.00.
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The parties are directed to pick up their exhibits within thirty days or they will either be
sent to the parties or destroyed at the Court’s discretion in compliance with DRP-185.
This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
May 25, 2022
______________________________
HON. JACK STOLLER
J.H.C.
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